Reconsidering Shaw: The Miranda of Race-Conscious Districting by Saunders, Melissa L
Essay
Reconsidering Shaw: The Miranda of
Race-Conscious Districting
Melissa L. Saunders'
In Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I)' and its progeny, the United States Supreme
Court relied upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to impose limits on race-conscious districting. In Shan, the
Court held that five North Carolina voters had stated a claim under the
Equal Protection Clause in alleging that the state's congressional
redistricting plan contained districts shaped so dramatically irregular that
they could only be viewed as having been drawn along racial lines.' In a
series of subsequent cases, the Court developed an elaborate framework for
the adjudication of these Shaw claims.' Under that framework, the
plaintiff's initial burden is to show, using direct or circumstantial evidence
or a combination of both, that the state used race as the "predominant
factor" in the design of the challenged district, "subordinat[ing] traditional
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1. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
2. See id. at 642, 658. The plan contained two districts that were highly irregular in shape:
District 1, a majority-black district that had been described as resembling a "Rorschach ink-blot
test" or a "bug splattered on a windshield," id. at 635, and District 12, a majority-black district
that the Court described as "wind[ing] in snakelike fashion," id., for nearly 160 miles along
Interstate 85, often no wider than the highway itself, so that " [i]f you drove down the interstate
with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in [it]," id. at 636 (quoting a state
legislator). The voters who challenged the plan, all of whom were white, claimed that it violated
their constitutional "right" to participate in a colorblind electoral process. See id4 at 641-42.
3. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958-65 (1996) (plurality opinion); Shaw v. Hunt
(Shaw I), 517 U.S. 899, 905-07 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
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race-neutral districting principles ... to racial considerations." 4  If the
plaintiff makes this showing, the plan is subject to strict scrutiny and will be
held unconstitutional unless the state demonstrates that its use of race was
"narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest." 5 Applying this
framework, the Court has declared unconstitutional a number of "safe"
districts created for racial minorities after the 1990 census.
6
From the beginning, critics have charged that the limitations on race-
conscious districting set forth in Shaw and its progeny have no foundation
in the Equal Protection Clause. Justice White has accused the Court of
"imagining an entirely new cause of action" 7 that "the Constitution does
not justify, much less mandate." 8 Justice Stevens has charged the Court
with having invented a new right-a "right to color-blind districting" -that
has "no basis" in the Constitution. 9 Justice Breyer has said that he "do[es]
not believe that the Constitution embodies the doctrine that the majority
enunciates." "10 With these criticisms have come predictable allegations that
an activist Court has improperly invoked the Constitution to justify
imposing its own policy preferences on the nation."
These criticisms cannot easily be dismissed. While the Court's new
limitations on race-conscious districting may make good sense as a matter
4. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916. The Court describes the "traditional race-neutral districting
principles" to which it refers as "including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect
for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests." Id.
5. Id. at 920. The Court has held that remedying the effects of past or present racial
discrimination may, in a proper case, be a compelling state interest. See Shaw 11, 517 U.S. at 909-
10. It has assumed, without deciding, that compliance with the Voting Rights Act, as it has been
interpreted by the Court, may also be a compelling state interest. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 976-77
(plurality opinion); Shaw 11, 517 U.S. at 911; Miller, 515 U.S. at 920-21.
6. See Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (plurality opinion) (invalidating three majority-minority
congressional districts in Texas, two majority-black and the third majority-Hispanic); Shaw II,
517 U.S. 899 (invalidating a majority-black congressional district in North Carolina); Miller, 515
U.S. 900 (invalidating two majority-black congressional districts in Georgia).
7. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630, 659 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 674.
9. Shaw 11, 517 U.S. at 925 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Vera, 517 U.S. at 1041
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that "nothing in the Constitution requires this unnecessary
intrusion into the ability of States to negotiate solutions to political differences while providing
long-excluded groups the opportunity to participate effectively in the democratic process").
10. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 119 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
11. See, e.g., David Kairys, Race Trilogy, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 12 (1994) (accusing the Court
of "judicial activism"); Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the
Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287, 311 (1996) (accusing the Court of improperly invoking
the Constitution to justify "impos[ing] its own vision of democratic theory" on the nation); J.
Morgan Kousser, Shaw v. Reno and the Real World of Redistricting and Representation, 26
RUTGERS L.J. 625, 648 (1995) (accusing the Court of "disregard[ing] the conservative tradition of
judicial restraint"); Jamin Raskin & Thomas Goldstein, Turning the Voting Rights Act on Its
Head, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1994, at M5 (describing Shaw as an "outburst of judicial activism by
the court's conservatives"); Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, NEW REPUBLIC. July 31.
1995, at 19 (criticizing the Court for its "judicial activism").
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of public policy, 2 the Court has yet to provide a convincing explanation for
them as principles of constitutional law. Indeed, the Court seems deeply
uncertain about the precise nature of the constitutional wrong that it is
attempting to redress in these cases. 3 This basic conceptual uncertainty,
together with a series of unexplained doctrinal quirks, has confused and
confounded the state officials and lower-court judges who labor with the
doctrine at the ground level. The Shaw doctrine, it seems, is not only
inconsistent with the Court's traditional equal protection jurisprudence, but
is also simply incomprehensible.
Despite these difficulties, Shaw's limitations on race-conscious
districting seem destined to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. Ignoring
the complaints of the dissenting Justices and a flood of critical commentary
from the academy, the five-member majority that decided Shaw has
now applied its rule in nearly a dozen cases."' While that majority
remains deeply divided about Shaw's implications, 5 it shows no signs of
12. To be sure, there is powerful empirical evidence that racial-bloc voting remains
pervasive, at least in the South, and that it continues to make it very difficult for minority
candidates to win election to any legislative office-local, state, or national-in districts that are
majority-white. See DAvID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL
GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS 39-54 (1997): QUIET REVOLUTION
IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT. 1965-1990, at 311, 336-39, 345
(Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994); David Lublin, The Election of African
Americans and Latinos to the U.S. House of Representatives, 1972-1994. 25 AM. POL Q. 269,
271-85 (1997). Nonetheless, there are good reasons for persons of all ideological persuasions to
think that race-conscious districting may not be a wise way to deal with this problem. For one
thing, race-conscious districting may do more to exacerbate existing patterns of racially polarized
voting than to eradicate them. See Shiaw 1, 509 U.S. at 647-48 (asserting that race-conscious
districting "may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that litl is sometimes said to
counteract" by "reinforc[ing] the perception that members of the same racial group... think
alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls").
Furthermore, there is some empirical evidence that the creation of "safe" districts for racial
minorities may make legislative bodies as a whole less responsive to the substantive political
interests of those minorities. See LUBLIN, supra, at 99; Charles Cameron et al.. Do Majority-
Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 AI. POL SCI.
REV. 794, 807-08 (1996). For these reasons, it may well be desirable, as a matter of public policy,
to impose strict legal constraints on the practice of race-conscious districting, even though it aims
to ameliorate the profound and persistent problem of minority exclusion from our political
processes.
13. For a careful exploration of this conceptual uncertainty and the fault lines that lie beneath
it, see Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein. ldentif.ing the Harm in Racial
Gerrymandering Claims, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 47 (1996).
14. Eight of these cases have received plenary consideration. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S.
541 (1999); Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997): Abrams, 521 U.S. 74; Vera.
517 U.S. 952 (plurality opinion); Shaw 11, 517 U.S. 899; Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995);
United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995): Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630. The rest have been decided
summarily. See Quilter v. Voinovich, 523 U.S. 1043 (1998) (mem.). affg 981 F. Supp. 1032
(N.D. Ohio 1997); DeWitt v. Wilson, 515 U.S. 1170 (1995) (mem.). affig 856 F. Supp. 1409
(E.D. Cal. 1994).
15. For example, Justice O'Connor asserts that Shaw does not require the application of strict
scrutiny to majority-minority districts that, though intentionally created. are drawn in substantial
compliance with certain traditional districting principles. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 958-59, 962
(plurality opinion); id. at 993 (O'Connor, J.. concurring). By contrast, Justices Scalia and Thomas,
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abandoning its holding, 6 and even the dissenting Justices now concede that
"the Court seems settled in its conclusion that racial gerrymandering claims
such as these may be pursued." '" That being the case, it is time, as Rick
Pildes has said, for academic commentators to stop their "unproductiv[e]"
efforts to convince the Court to overturn Shaw and concentrate instead on
trying to understand it "on its own terms." 1s
In this Essay, I want to suggest one way in which we might begin to do
that: by considering the possibility that the limitations on race-conscious
districting set forth in Shaw and its progeny are much like the limits that
Miranda v. Arizona'9 imposed upon police interrogation of suspects in
custody. That is, they are a "prophylactic" measure that overprotects
individual constitutional rights in some cases in order to ensure adequate
protection of those rights across a range of cases. Prophylactic rules of this
sort have been a familiar, if somewhat controversial, feature of the Court's
work in other areas of constitutional law."0 Both the law of constitutional
criminal procedure and that of the First Amendment are full of rules that
can be characterized as prophylactic in nature." Nor are prophylactic rules
unheard of in equal protection law-the strict scrutiny of classical equal
protection doctrine, for example, can be seen as a prophylactic rule.22 Shaw
and its progeny, I suggest, are simply the latest example of a phenomenon
that is pervasive in our constitutional law.
In suggesting that Shaw is like Miranda, I do not mean to damn it by
association; I take no position on the longstanding debate over the Court's
authority to craft overbroad prophylactic rules to enforce the Constitution.2"
But I do mean to suggest that those who believe Miranda to be a legitimate
and probably Justice Kennedy, believe that it does. See id. at 999-1003 (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment); id. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (applying strict scrutiny, but not reaching
Justice O'Connor's broader views on the application of strict scrutiny).
16. Indeed, the majority has taken to dismissing with obvious irritation the dissenters'
arguments that Shaw should be overturned. See, e.g., Vera, 517 U.S. at 983-84 (plurality opinion);
Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 904 n.2.
17. Vera, 517 U.S. at 1009 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
18. Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106
YALE L.J. 2505, 2509 (1997).
19. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
20. The classic here is David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI.
L. REv. 190 (1988). For further discussion, see Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and
Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 857, 899-904 (1999); and Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435, 448-53 (1987). Levinson argues that
prophylactic rules are such a pervasive feature of our constitutional law that attempting to
distinguish the "core" of a constitutional right from its "prophylactic periphery" is "both
hopeless and pointless." Levinson, supra, at 900.
21. For some concrete examples, see Levinson, supra note 20, at 902-04; and Strauss, supra
note 20, at 195-204.
22. See Strauss, supra note 20, at 204-07.
23. For the argument that the Court lacks the constitutional power to do this, see Joseph D.
Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw.
U. L. REv. 100 (1985). For an argument to the contrary, see Strauss, supra note 20.
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exercise of the Court's authority have no business arguing that Shaw is
illegitimate and, conversely, that those who believe Shaw to be legitimate
have no business arguing that Miranda is not. For this reason, the debate
over Shaw's legitimacy could have important implications for the challenge
to Miranda that looms on the Court's horizon. 24
Part I of this Essay explains why Shaw's critics believe that the
limitations that the case imposes on race-conscious districting lack any real
basis in the Equal Protection Clause. The essential problem, in their view, is
that Shaw permits courts to declare laws "unconstitutional" under the
Clause in the absence of any proof that they subject any identifiable class of
persons to a special disadvantage. Because a showing that the challenged
law has such a "discriminatory effect" on a discrete class has always been
thought to be an essential element of an equal protection claim, they assert,
Shaw and its progeny represent a substantial extension of existing doctrine,
an extension that the Court has failed even to acknowledge, much less to
justify.
Part II of the Essay considers the possibility that the Court is using
these cases to effect a major change in its equal protection jurisprudence:
declaring that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the state to use race in
dealing with people, absent truly extraordinary justification, even when it is
not subjecting any identifiable class of persons to any special disadvantage.
While I concede that this may explain the votes cast by some members of
the Shaw majority, I conclude that it cannot explain the Shaw doctrine
itself, as it is currently constituted.
Part I offers an alternative explanation for the Court's failure to
require proof of special disadvantage to an identifiable class of persons in
these cases. I argue that the Court is applying an overbroad per se rule
much like the one it applies in Miranda. This Part begins with a brief
review of Miranda's per se rule and the justification that the Court has
given for it. It then seeks to demonstrate that Shaw and its progeny can be
explained on similar grounds. So understood, I argue, the doctrine that the
Court has constructed here is neither as radical nor as incoherent as its
critics have maintained. But it is too imprecise to be workable, and the
Court needs to rectify this problem if the doctrine is to realize its full
potential. Part II offers some ideas about how this might be accomplished.
The Essay concludes with some brief thoughts on the implications of
this reading of Shaw.
24. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir.) (holding that Congress has the
power to bypass the requirements of Miranda with ordinary legislation, and that it has done so in
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994)), cert. granted, 120 S. CL 578 (1999). For a discussion of Dickerson and
the possibility that the Court will use it to reconsider or overrule Miranda, see Roger Parloff,
Miranda on the Hot Seat, N.Y. Tmos, Sept. 26, 1999, § 6 (Magazine). at 84.
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I. THE PROBLEM WITH SHAW
From the beginning, the Court has characterized Shaw's limitations on
race-conscious districting as a routine application of longstanding principles
of its equal protection jurisprudence. The Court's logic, first set forth in
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Shaw I and reiterated in each of its progeny,
goes as follows: The Equal Protection Clause requires courts to apply strict
scrutiny to all laws that classify persons on the basis of their race.25 An
electoral districting plan that draws lines on the basis of race is a law that
"classifies" persons by race.26 It therefore follows inexorably that such a
law must be subject to strict scrutiny.27 To the extent that the lower courts
have read the plurality opinion in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey8
as suggesting that race-conscious districting plans adopted with the
"benign" purpose of giving effect to minority voting strength are exempt
from these principles,29 they have erred.
At first glance, this looks like a straightforward application of the
"suspect classification" strand of traditional equal protection doctrine. If
one looks beyond rhetoric to reality, though, it reveals itself to be a
substantial-and unexplained-extension of that doctrine. Strict scrutiny, it
must be remembered, is not a substantive rule of law that the Court has
derived from the Equal Protection Clause, but a framework it has erected
for the adjudication of equal protection claims, a framework designed to
help courts identify violations of equal protection rights.3" Traditional equal
25. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904-05 (1995); Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630, 642-44
(1993).
26. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Shaw I describes race-conscious districting
laws as "laws that classify citizens by race," 509 U.S. at 644, as "legislation classifying citizens
by race," id. at 646, as laws that "classify voters on the basis of race." id. at 649, and as "[rlacial
classifications with respect to voting," id. at 657. Later cases in the Shaw line adhere to this
characterization. See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 119 S. Ct. 1545, 1548-49 (1999) (describing
"racially gerrymandered districting schemes" as "laws that classify citizens on the basis of
race"); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1001 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing race-
conscious districting laws as "racial classifications"); Shaw 11, 517 U.S. 899, 904 (1996)
(describing "racially gerrymandered districting scheme[s]" as "laws that classify citizens on the
basis of race"); Miller, 515 U.S. at 910 (describing race-conscious districting laws as the
"deliberate classification of voters on the basis of race").
Of course, as the Court concedes, these laws do not explicitly classify by race; indeed, they
do not mention race at all. See Cromartie, 119 S. Ct. at 1549 ("Districting legislation
ordinarily ... is race-neutral on its face."). But the Court characterizes them as racial
classifications of the "covert" variety: facially race-neutral laws that are intended to have, and do
have, the effect of classifying citizens by race. See id.; Miller, 515 U.S. at 905 (citing Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)); Shaw I. 509 U.S.
at 642-44 (same).
27. See Cromartie, 119 S. Ct. at 1549; Vera, 517 U.S. at 984 (plurality opinion); Miller. 515
U.S. at 904-05; Shawl, 509 U.S. at 644.
28. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
29. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 914-15; Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 651-52.
30. For the classic explanation, see Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949). For more recent commentary to the same
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protection doctrine is based on the premise that a law must subject an
identifiable class of persons to some special disadvantage in order to be
challengeable under the Equal Protection Clause.3 It is the imposition of
this special disadvantage that must, according to the traditional
understanding, be justified by reference to an adequate public purpose if the
law is to survive an equal protection challenge. 2 When strict scrutiny is
triggered,33 this special disadvantage must be shown to be narrowly tailored
to promote a compelling state interest.
effect, see, for example, JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DtsTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEw 147 (1980); Robert W. Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial
Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CAL. L. REv. 1049. 1077 (1979). Michael J. Perry. Modern
Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1033-36 (1979);
and Cass IR Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982
Sup. CT. REv. 127, 140-43.
31. See Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96
MICH. L. REV. 245, 245 (1997). As every student of modem equal protection law knows,
Washington v. Davis and its progeny impose a further requirement: a showing that the state has
"intentionally" or "purposefully" subjected the plaintiff to this special disadvantage. Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976); see also Village of Arlington Heights. 429 U.S. at 265. As
I have explained elsewhere, however, they do not purport to relieve the plaintiff of the obligation
to show that the law does in fact subject him to that special disadvantage. See Saunders. supra, at
308-09.
32. Of course, most laws can be characterized as subjecting some class of persons to some
sort of special disadvantage, and so most can be challenged under the Equal Protection Clause. To
prevent the Clause from authorizing constant judicial second-guessing of the policy judgments of
elected state officials, the Court has directed reviewing courts to apply certain presumptions in
adjudicating equal protection claims. In most cases, they are to apply a strong presumption that
the special disadvantage serves a legitimate public purpose, a presumption that the challenger can
overcome only by demonstrating that the classification cannot "rationally" be said to further any
"legitimate" governmental purpose. See. e.g.. Heller v. Doe. 509 U.S. 312. 319-20 (1993);
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1. 14 (1988); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166, 175-77 (1980); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256. 272-73 (1979). In certain
situations in which it is very likely that the special disadvantage does not serve a legitimate public
purpose, however, courts are to abandon the usual presumption of validity and take a closer look.
See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272-73. In some situations, this closer look takes the form of "strict
scrutiny," in which the court applies a strong presumption that the special disadvantage does not
serve a legitimate public purpose, a presumption that the state can overcome only by
demonstrating that it is "necessary" to achieve a "compelling" govemental purpose. See. e.g..
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (applying the suspect-
classification strand); id at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (applying the fundamental-rights strand).
33. Strict scrutiny is triggered by a showing that the state has used a "suspect" criterion like
race to select the class of persons upon whom the special disadvantage will be imposed. See. e.g.,
Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94; id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). In this context, the
directive to apply more exacting scrutiny reflects the intuition that the real reason for the state's
decision to impose a special disadvantage on that class is very likely to be impermissible animus.
See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) ("Classifying persons according to their
race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than legitimate public concerns... .- ); Feeney, 442
U.S. at 272 (asserting that racial classifications "supply a reason to infer antipathy" (quoting
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979))). Requiring the state to demonstrate that imposition of
the special disadvantage is "necessary" to achieve a "compelling" state interest serves as a way
of "smoking out" impermissible animus that the state may be concealing behind pretextual public
purpose justifications. See ELY, supra note 30, at 146; Jed Rubenfeld. Affirmative Action, 107
YALE LJ. 427, 436-37 (1997).
20001 1609
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 109: 1603
The difficulty with Shaw and its progeny, from the standpoint of
traditional equal protection jurisprudence, is that these cases permit courts
to declare laws unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause in the
absence of evidence that the laws subject any identifiable class of persons
to special disadvantage.' 4 This quirk was not immediately apparent from the
Court's opinion in Shaw L To be sure, as the dissenters pointed out, the
Shaw plaintiffs did not allege or prove that they were being subjected to the
kind of special disadvantage that usually forms the basis of an equal
protection challenge to district lines-dilution of their voting strength.35 But
their case came to the Court on appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a
claim,36 and their complaint, generously viewed, could be read to allege that
the plan subjected them to a special disadvantage of another kind-
specifically, to some sort of special "stigmatic" or "representational"
harm.37 Because Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court held only that
their allegations were sufficient to state a claim,38 and because it relied
specifically on the possibility that the law might inflict these special
stigmatic or representational harms to explain why that claim was
cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause,39 the Court did not foreclose
the possibility that the plaintiffs would be required to prove at trial that they
had suffered special disadvantage.'
34. The problem can also be characterized as one of standing to sue, and Shaw's critics have
often done so. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights
Trilogy, 1993 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 278-80 (asserting that the Shaw plaintiffs lacked Article III
standing to challenge North Carolina's congressional redistricting in federal court because they
did not allege that it had caused them to suffer an individualized "injury in fact"); Karlan, supra
note 11, at 289-99 (same); Frank R. Parker, The Constitutionality of Racial Redistricting: A
Critique of Shaw v. Reno, 3 D.C. L. REv. 1, 9-22 (1995) (same); see also Shaw 11, 517 U.S. 899,
918, 923 n.3 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
because they had not alleged any legally cognizable injury); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 929
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (same); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1995)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (same). But it is also, and more fundamentally, one that
goes to the validity of the plaintiffs' claim on the merits, since a showing that the plaintiffs have
been subjected to some special disadvantage is an essential-indeed, the most essential-element
of the constitutional claim they are asserting. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan.
Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2292 (1998)
(asserting that the "hard question" here is not "who can sue" but how the Constitution plausibly
can be interpreted to forbid the race-based districting practices at which Shaw and its progeny
strike).
35. See Shaw L 509 U.S. 630, 666-67 (1993) (White, J., dissenting); id. at 682 (Souter. J.,
dissenting).
36. See id. at 638-39.
37. See Complaint at 7, Shaw v. Barr (E.D.N.C. Mar. 12, 1992) (No. 92-202). But see Shaw I,
509 U.S. at 686 n.9 (Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the complaint nowhere alleges any
type of stigmatic harm").
38. See Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 658.
39. See id. at 649-50.
40. Seizing upon this ambiguity, the defendant-intervenors in Shaw, on remand from the
Court's decision in Shaw I, argued that the plaintiffs could not prevail at trial without proving that
they had suffered special stigmatic or representational harm. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408,
423-24 (E.D.N.C. 1994), rev'don other grounds, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
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The Court's decision in Miller v. Johnson, however, quickly dispelled
this notion. There, the Court affirmed a district court's holding that a race-
conscious districting scheme was unconstitutional under Shaw in the
absence of any finding that it had caused any identifiable class of persons to
suffer either of the "special harms" mentioned in Shaw," much less any
other kind of special disadvantage. The implication of the Court's decision
was hard to avoid: A plaintiff may prevail on a Shaw claim without
producing any evidence that the challenged law actually subjects any
identifiable class of persons to special disadvantage." That in turn seemed,
to many observers, to represent a substantial extension of traditional equal
protection jurisprudence, for the Court had never before invoked the Equal
Protection Clause to strike down a law without finding that it subjected
some group to special disadvantage.43
The extension did not go unnoticed by the Court itself. In lengthy
dissents in the two Shaw cases decided the following Term, Justices
Stevens and Souter drew attention to it.' Dissenting in Shaw v. Hunt
(Shaw II), Justice Stevens wrote,
Even if an objection to a State's decision to forgo color-blind
districting is cognizable under some constitutional provision, I do
not understand why that provision should be the Equal Protection
Clause....
... Mhe Equal Protection Clause... protects against wrongs
which by definition burden some persons but not others.
Here... it appears that no individual has been burdened more
than any other. The supposedly insidious messages that Shaw I
contends will follow from extremely irregular race-based districting
41. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). In Miller, neither the district court nor the
Supreme Court made any finding that the plaintiffs had suffered special stigmatic or
representational harm. See Karlan, supra note !1, at 296. Indeed, the district court, although it
struck down the redistricting plan, made a specific finding that the plaintiffs had not suffered any
such harm. See Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1370 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (holding that the
challenged redistricting plans caused the plaintiffs to suffer "no individual harm" and "had no
adverse consequences for the[m]"), afrd, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
42. See Karlan, supra note 11, at 296 (noting that Miller "seems to have abandoned any
requirement that the plaintiffs even allege, let alone prove," any of the special harms mentioned in
Shaw 1); see also Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 34, at 2285-86 n.48 (noting that in deciding
Shaw claims on the merits, the Court has failed to require plaintiffs to prove that they have
suffered any special stigmatic or representational harm).
43. See Issacharoff & Goldstein, supra note 13, at 56; Karlan. supra note 11, at 296;
Saunders, supra note 31, at 325-26.
44. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1045 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); Shaw 11, 517 U.S.
899, 918 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In contrast to the Shaw I dissents. see 509 U.S. at 658-75
(White, J., dissenting); id. at 679-87 (Souter, J., dissenting), these dissents did not take the
position that a showing of vote dilution or denial was necessary to make out an equal protection
claim in this contexL Instead, they seemed to acknowledge that a special disadvantage of some
other kind, like stigmatic or representational harm, if adequately proven, might also suffice. See
Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 926-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Vera, 517 U.S. at 1045-46 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
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will presumably be received in equal measure by all state residents.
For that reason, the claimed violation of a shared right to a color-
blind districting process would not seem to implicate the Equal
Protection Clause at all ....
Justice Souter's dissent in Bush v. Vera made essentially the same
point. The equal protection claim recognized in Shaw, wrote Souter, is "at
odds" with "the logic of traditional equal protection analysis," for it does
not address "harm... to any identifiable class singled out for
disadvantage." 4 6 In Shaw and its progeny, he concluded, the Court has
"broke[n] abruptly with ... the very understanding of equal protection as a
practical guarantee against harm to some class singled out for disparate
treatment." 
47
II. SHAW AS DOCTRINAL EARTHQUAKE?
Perhaps Justice Souter is right that the Court is dispensing with the
notion-implicit in all of its prior equal protection cases, though seldom
squarely stated-that a law cannot be challenged under the Equal Protection
Clause unless it subjects an identifiable class of persons to some special
disadvantage. Perhaps it is in fact effecting a significant change in its equal
protection jurisprudence, declaring that the Equal Protection Clause forbids
the state to use race in governing, absent truly extraordinary justification,
even when it is not subjecting any identifiable class of persons to special
disadvantage.4 8 There certainly are strong indications that at least three
members of the Shaw majority-Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-
would like to see the Court's equal protection jurisprudence move in this
direction, 9 and it may well be that they are using Shaw and its progeny as a
vehicle for doing just that."
45. Shaw 11, 517 U.S. at 923-24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. Vera, 517 U.S. at 1053-54 (Souter, J., dissenting).
47. Id at 1053.
48. For this interpretation of the cases, see James F. Blumstein, Shaw v. Reno and Miller v.
Johnson: Where We Are and Where We Are Headed, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 503, 504 (1996). For an
argument that such an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause would be profoundly
inconsistent with the original understanding, see Saunders, supra note 31.
49. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that the Constitution "reject[s] ... dispositions
based on race"), id. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(observing that "under our Constitution, the government may not make distinctions on the basis
of race"); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120-21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (asserting
that "the principle that the government must treat citizens as individuals, and not as members of
racial ... groups," lies "[alt the heart... of the Equal Protection Clause"): Johnson v. De
Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1029-30 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (commenting that "'racial classifications do not become legitimate on the assumption
that all persons suffer them in equal degree"' (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410
(1991))); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989) (Kennedy J..
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Whatever the merits of this theory as an explanation for the votes that
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas have cast in these cases, it cannot
satisfactorily explain the Shaw doctrine itself as it is currently formulated. It
cannot explain, for example, why the Court has held that the strict scrutiny
of Shaw does not apply whenever the state intentionally takes race into
account in districting, but only when it makes race the "predominant
factor" in districting." If Shaw really means that all intentional uses of race
by the state are unconstitutional, at least in the absence of truly compelling
justification, then its strict scrutiny logically should apply whenever there is
evidence that the state has intentionally considered race in districting,
whether or not it has made race the "predominant factor" in that process."
Nor can it explain why the Court, through Justice O'Connor, has
insisted that the strict scrutiny of Shaw does not apply whenever the state
intentionally designs a district to give a certain racial group a majority, so
long as it does not substantially disregard certain "traditional" districting
principles to do so. 3 Again, if Shaw really means that all intentional uses of
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (asserting that "racial neutrality is the driving
force of the Equal Protection Clause"); id. at 521 (Scalia, J.. concurring in the judgment)
(characterizing the Fourteenth Amendment as embodying a general principle of colorblindness).
At the moment, these Justices concede-somewhat reluctantly-that there are some
circumstances in which the use of race may be constitutionally permissible, though they maintain
that these circumstances are few and far between. See, e.g.. Croson, 488 U.S. at 519 (Kennedy. J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 520-21 (Scalia. J., concurring in the
judgment).
50. For an argument that these three Justices are using the racial-gerrymandering cases as a
vehicle for advancing their broader agenda of eradicating all use of race from governmental
decisionmaking, see Issacharoff & Goldstein, supra note 13. at 48-49. Some observers place Chief
Justice Rehnquist in the same camp. See id. In my view, however, his position on this matter is
more ambiguous. Unlike Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, he joined Justice Souter's
opinion for the Court in Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 521 U.S. 567 (1997). which upheld a
race-conscious districting plan against equal protection challenge. He also joined Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion in Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996), which indicated a greater
tolerance for the use of race in redistricting than did the separate concurrences of Justices
Kennedy and Thomas. Finally, he joined Part IV of Justice White's plurality opinion in United
Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), which rejected an equal protection challenge
to a race-conscious districting plan.
51. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 958-59, 962-63 (plurality opinion); id. at 993 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916-17 (1995); id. at 928-29 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
52. See Samuel Issacharoff, The Constitutional Contours of Race and Politics, 1995 Sup. Cr.
REv. 45, 63, 65 (arguing that if Shat means that "all ... race-based decision making" by a state
is "unconstitutional absent truly extraordinary, compelling state interests." then "any redistricting
activity in which race played a role" should be suspect). Perhaps not surprisingly, Justices Scalia.
Thomas, and Kennedy recently have begun to express some discomfort with this aspect of the
doctrine. See infra note 137.
53. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 958-59 (plurality opinion) (asserting that the strict scrutiny of Shaw
applies only where "the State has relied on race in substantial disregard of customary and
traditional districting practices" (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 928 (O'Connor, J., concurring)))- id.
at 962 (holding that a showing that the state has "neglected traditional districting criteria" is
"necessary" to trigger the strict scrutiny of Shaw); id. at 993 (0' Connor, J., concurring) (finding
that the strict scrutiny of Shaw applies " only if traditional districting criteria are neglected and
that neglect is predominantly due to the misuse of race"); id. at 1012 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
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race by the state are unconstitutional, absent truly compelling justification,
then its strict scrutiny logically should apply whenever there is evidence
that the state has intentionally designed a district to have a certain racial
makeup, whether or not it has substantially disregarded any traditional
districting principles in the process.'
Nor, finally, can it explain the peculiar standing rule that the Court,
again through Justice O'Connor, has crafted for Shaw claims. Under that
rule, a Shaw challenge to a state's use of race in constructing a statewide
districting plan is not available to every individual who resides in the
state." Instead, only those individuals who reside in districts that have been
"racially gerrymandered" -that is, districts whose lines have been drawn
"predominantly" on the basis of race, in substantial disregard of certain
traditional districting principles-have standing to assert such a claim. 6 If
Shaw really means that it is unconstitutional for the state to take an
individual's race into account in dealing with him, at least in the absence of
a truly compelling justification, then this rule makes no sense. To construct
one or more "racially gerrymandered" districts, a state must take race into
account, at least to some degree, in designing the other districts in the same
plan.57 If mere consideration of race is the problem, then all of the state's
residents should have standing to assert a Shaw claim. 8
To be sure, all of these quirks are clearly contributions of Justice
O'Connor, who is less hostile to governmental use of race than are Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy. But Justice O'Connor is the principal
(same); id. at 1056-57, 1065, 1072-73 (Souter, J., dissenting) (same); see also DeWitt v. Wilson,
856 F. Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (refusing to apply the strict scrutiny of Shaw to an
intentionally created majority-minority district that complied with traditional notions of
compactness), affd mem., 515 U.S. 1170 (1995).
54. See Richard Briffault, Race and Representation After Miller v. Johnson, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 23, 45 (arguing that "[i]f the value vindicated by Shaw is racial neutrality, then it is
difficult to see why ... the concern ... should be cabined to irregularly shaped districts and not
expanded to... any intentional use of race in districting"). Perhaps not surprisingly, Justices
Scalia and Thomas have voiced explicit disagreement with this aspect of the doctrine, see Vera,
517 U.S. at 1000-03 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the strict scrutiny of
Shaw should apply whenever the state "affirmatively undertakes to create" a district of a certain
racial makeup, whether or not it disregards any traditional districting principles in order to do so).
and Justice Kennedy has evidenced considerable discomfort with it, see id. at 996 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (explicifly reserving judgment on this question).
55. See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744 (1995).
56. See id. at 744-45.
57. See Issacharoff & Goldstein, supra note 13, at 64 (" [I]n districting, a decision to include
one kind of person is fundamentally also a decision to exclude other kinds of people.");
Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 34, at 2286-87 (explaining that both the minority citizens who
were included in the district and the white citizens who were excluded from it were "victims of
the same offensive, demeaning, or reductionist assumptions" about their political identity
(emphasis omitted)).
58. See Issacharoff & Goldstein, supra note 13, at 63-64; Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note
34, at 2285-88.
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architect of the Shaw doctrine," and these quirks are part of the fabric of the
doctrine as it now stands. As a result, no theory that purports to explain
what the Court as an institution is doing in these cases is worth its salt
unless it can account for them. Since the theory described above cannot, it
is not a plausible explanation for what the Court as a whole is doing here. If
we are to understand the Shaw doctrine, then, we must find something else.
One possibility, the one I want to explore here, is that Shaw and its
progeny do not alter the traditional notion that proof of special disadvantage
to an identifiable class of persons is an essential element of an equal
protection claim, but instead establish a presumption that plaintiffs in race-
conscious districting cases can use to prove it.' Presumptions are a familiar
feature of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence; indeed, the multi-
tiered standard of review is in reality but a series of presumptions. 6' And we
know from Brown v. Board of Education62 that when a state deliberately
cordons off a racial minority from the rest of the population in its schools or
other public facilities, it is conclusively presumed to be subjecting that
minority to the special disadvantage of social stigmatization.' Perhaps
Shaw and its progeny rest on a similar presumption. If so, then the Court's
work here may not be as radical as it first appears, even if we grant Shaw's
critics their basic premise-that a law must subject an identifiable class of
persons to some special disadvantage in order to be vulnerable to challenge
under the Equal Protection Clause.
In the next Part, I develop this alternative understanding of the cases.
59. In addition to the opinion for the Court in the inaugural case of Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630
(1993), Justice O'Connor wrote the Court's opinion in Hays, 515 U.S. 737, which announced the
curious standing rule that applies to Shaw claims; a concurrence in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 928 (1995), which added an important qualification to Justice Kennedy's majority opinion;
the plurality opinion in Vera, 517 U.S. at 952; and a separate concurrence in the same case, see id.
at 990-95. As Sam Issacharoff has said, "There is no escaping the fact that the Supreme Court's
equal protection law is being driven by Justice O'Connor." Issacharoff, supra note 52, at 63.
60. Both Justice Souter and Justice Stevens have alluded to this possibility in dissent, though
they have asserted that there is no basis for presuming discriminatory effect here. See Slurw 11, 517
U.S. 899, 928-29 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 687 n.9 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
61. See Saunders, supra note 31, at 307-08 & n.286.
62. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
63. This is, in any event, the conventional academic explanation for Brown. See, e.g.,
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUTONA. LAW § 16-15. at 1477-78 (2d ed. 1988);
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.i. 421, 429-30 &
n.25 (1960); Paul Brest, The Supreme Court. 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1976). For a different explanation, see
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring), which asserts that
"[s]egregation was not unconstitutional because it... caused psychological feelings of
inferiority," but because it involved the "classifi[cation] [of] students based on their race." Ild. at
121-23.
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III. AN ALTERNATIVE UNDERSTANDING OF SHA W: THE MIRANDA OF
RACE-CONSCIOUS DISTRICTING
From the beginning, the Court, through Justice O'Connor, has insisted
that Shaw claims are concerned with individualized harm to a class of
persons who are being singled out for special disadvantage.' To date,
however, the Court has been unable to explain precisely how this can be so,
given its failure to require plaintiffs asserting these claims to prove that the
laws they challenge actually subject them-or anyone else-to a special
disadvantage. The explanation, I suggest, is that the Court has substituted a
conclusive presumption, or per se rule, for case-by-case determination of
this element of the equal protection claim. In this respect, the Court's work
closely resembles what it did in Miranda v. Arizona.65
In Miranda, a five-to-four majority of the Court relied upon the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to impose limits on police
interrogation of suspects in custody. The decision established strict
"warning" and "waiver" requirements with which law-enforcement
officials at all levels of government were required to comply if they wished
to avoid having the confessions they obtained excluded from criminal
trials. 6 The Court's decision ignited a firestorm of controversy. The
criticisms leveled at it were much like those that have been leveled at Shaw:
that these new limits on custodial interrogation had no foundation in the
Fifth Amendment and that the Court was improperly invoking the
Constitution to justify imposing its own policy preferences upon the
nation.
The Miranda majority offered the following justification for its
decision to impose these limits on police behavior:
(1) The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is one of our
most important constitutional rights."
64. See Shawl, 509 U.S. at 649-50; accord United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744 (1995).
65. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
66. See id. at 441-91.
67. For some prominent examples of such criticisms, see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 504-14
(Harlan, J., .dissenting); and U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION 3-41 (Feb. 12, 1986. with
addendum of Jan. 20, 1987), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437, 453-90 (1989). Even
today, some 30 years after it was decided, Miranda remains the subject of controversy. See, e.g.,
United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999); Paul G.
Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REV.
1084 (1996); Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 387 (1996); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year
Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV, 1055 (1998).
68. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58 (describing the privilege against self-incrimination as
"one of our Nation's most cherished principles").
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(2) Custodial interrogation, as it is currently being practiced in this country,
often results in suspects' being "compelled" to incriminate themselves,
in violation of that right.69
(3) The Court cannot read the Fifth Amendment to outlaw all custodial
interrogation or to forbid all uses of confessions in criminal trials."
(4) But the Court can, pursuant to its authority to enforce the Constitution,
require those who conduct custodial interrogations to take certain
precautions to reduce the risk that they will "compel" suspects to
incriminate themselves within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.?
(5) The precautions the Court recommends are to administer certain specific
warnings before beginning interrogation and to cease interrogation unless
the suspect makes a clear and unequivocal waiver of his right to remain
silent.72
(6) The Court cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires the police
to take these particular precautions, only that it requires them to take
precautions that are at least as effective as these.73
(7) To encourage the police to do that, the Court will direct the lower courts
not to admit into evidence any statement made in a custodial
interrogation that was not conducted in compliance with either its
recommended precautions or other precautions that the Court deems
equally effective. 4
(8) Requiring the police to take these precautions when they conduct
custodial interrogations should not interfere unduly with their ability to
enforce the criminal law, for the FBI has compiled an excellent record of
law enforcement while taking similar precautions. 5
In later cases, the Court described Miranda's exclusionary rule as
resting on an irrebuttable presumption, or per se rule, that any statement
made by a suspect during a custodial interrogation that had not been
conducted in compliance with the Court's recommended safeguards had
been "compelled" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 6 The
Court acknowledged that this rule was overbroad-that it required courts to
exclude some statements that had not been "compelled" in the
constitutional sense.' But the Court found use of the per se rule to be
69. See id. at 445-58, 467.
70. See id at 478.
71. See id. at 439,444, 467, 490-91.
72. See id at 467-76.
73. Seeid at467,490.
74. See id at 444,476,478-79.
75. See id at 479-86.
76. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 & n.I (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 654 (1984); id at 662 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-10; Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654-55 & n.5; Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433,442-46 (1974).
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justifiable notwithstanding its overbreadth, because it avoided various
problems associated with case-by-case assessment of the compulsion issue"8
and encouraged the police to modify their behavior in a way that would
substantially reduce the number of constitutional violations that occurred
during custodial interrogation.79
The limits on race-conscious districting set forth in Shaw and its
progeny can, I suggest, be justified on similar grounds.8" The argument
would go something like this: Race-conscious districting, at least as it has
been practiced since the 1990 census, poses the same sort of risk to
individual equal protection rights that custodial interrogation, as it was
being conducted in the early 1960s, posed to individual Fifth Amendment
rights. The Court cannot read the Equal Protection Clause to outlaw all
consideration of race in districting." But it can, pursuant to its authority to
enforce the Constitution, require those who engage in race-conscious
districting to take certain precautions to reduce the risk that they will violate
individual equal protection rights. The precaution the Court recommends is
to adhere to certain traditional districting principles in designing the
districts. The Court is unwilling to say that the Constitution necessarily
requires state actors engaged in race-conscious districting to take this
particular precautionR--just that it requires them to take some precaution
that is at least as effective as this one. To encourage them to do that, the
Court will direct the lower courts to apply a per se rule that whenever the
state takes race into account in designing an electoral district, without
taking either this recommended precaution or some equally effective
alternative, it presumptively subjects the district's residents to the sort of
78. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,433 & n.20 (1984).
79. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 467, 476, 478-79.
80. There is, of course, one rather obvious distinction between what the Court has done here
and what it did in Miranda. In Miranda, the Court "acted in the absence of a relevant Act of
Congress." United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 691 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 578
(1999). Here, by contrast, it has acted in the face of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973 (1994). However, this may be a distinction without a difference. While the Voting Rights
Act is designed to enforce Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights, it does not purport to
remedy or prevent the particular kind of equal protection violation with which the Court is here
concerned: the passage of race-conscious districting laws that have the effect of singling out
certain individuals, without adequate justification, for special stigmatic and representational
harms. In this respect, the situation that the Court confronted when it handed down Shaw and its
progeny was in fact much like the one that it confronted when it handed down Miranda: Congress
had failed to take action to deal with the particular constitutional evil about which the Court was
concerned.
81. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 995 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that
"race-based action" sometimes is necessary to "remedy the reality of racial inequality in our
political system"); Shaw l, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (asserting that "race-conscious redistricting
is not always unconstitutional").
82. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 962 (plurality opinion) (maintaining that "[t]he Constitution does
not mandate regularity of district shape"); Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 647 (observing that compliance
with traditional districting criteria like "compactness, contiguity, and respect for political
subdivisions" is "not... constitutionally required").
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special disadvantage that will support an equal protection claim.
Application of this per se rule should not interfere unduly with states'
ability to design workable electoral districts, for virtually every state in the
country adhered to these districting principles until the 1990s,s when the
United States Department of Justice began to pressure some of them to
draw bizarrely shaped districts in order to maximize representation of
African Americans in the nation's legislatures.'
Of course, if the Court is engaging in this sort of reasoning here, it is
not doing so explicitly. The Court never has attempted to justify the Shinv
doctrine in precisely this way. But this is not unusual-the prophylactic
justification for a rule often fails to emerge until well after the rule itself is
promulgated.s And as David Strauss has pointed out, whether a doctrine
can be considered prophylactic should depend not "on how the Court
happens to have written its opinions but on how the relevant constitutional
provision is most plausibly interpreted."86 That the Court itself has yet to
provide a prophylactic justification for Shaw therefore should not prevent
us from considering the very real possibility that the doctrine can be
justified in just those termsY In this Part, I attempt to develop that
justification.
83. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 985 (plurality opinion); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 928
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that Shaw and its progeny "do[ I not throw into
doubt the vast majority of the Nation's 435 congressional districts," because "the States have
drawn the boundaries in accordance with ... customary districting principles").
84. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 921, 924-25 & n.* (discussing the Justice Department's "black
max" policy).
85. For example, the prophylactic justification for Miranda's exclusionary rule did not
emerge fully until Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649
(1984); and Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). Similarly, the prophylactic justification for
the rule of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). which held that whenever a judge
imposes a more severe sentence upon a criminal defendant following retrial, it will be treated as
the product of unconstitutional vindictiveness unless the judge justifies the increase on the record
by reference to the defendant's conduct after the original sentencing, see id. at 726, did not
emerge until Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17
(1973); and Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973).
86. Strauss, supra note 20. at 196; see also Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's Constitutional
Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 174, 181 (1988).
87. In this regard, it is worth noting that Justice O'Connor has been the principal architect of
the Shaw doctrine, see supra note 59, and that minimalism has always been one of the most
striking characteristics of her constitutional jurisprudence, see, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen. Foreword, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1331 (1999) (citing Justice O'Connor's opinions in Shaw and its progeny as
prime examples); Jeffrey Rosen, The Age of Mixed Results, NEW REPUBUC, June 28, 1999. at 43,
46 (reviewing CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME JUDICIAL MINIWAUs.M IN THE SUPREME
COURT (1999)). For a general account of the Rehnquist Court's penchant for minimalism, see
SuNSTmN, supra; and Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996).
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A. The Nature of the Constitutional Violation Feared
To understand the prophylactic justification for Shaw, we must first
understand the premise with which the Court begins: that race-conscious
districting, as it has been practiced in this country since the 1990 census,
poses a serious risk to individual equal protection rights. This is so, the
Court insists, even when it does not have the effect of diluting the strength
of any identifiable group's vote. 88 Why? The Court's general answer is
that it "threatens" to subject certain individuals to special disadvantages
of a different sort, disadvantages that, if not adequately justified, will
violate their equal protection rights.89 The Court has indicated that these
special disadvantages are of two basic types: "stigmatic" harms and
"representational" harms. 90 It has done little, however, to describe these
harms or to explain how race-conscious districting may inflict them. The
Court's failure to provide these details has, I believe, tended to obscure the
Miranda-like reasoning that lies behind the Shaw doctrine. I therefore begin
by attempting to describe, in some detail, the special stigmatic and
representational harms with which the Court seems to be concerned.
1. Stigmatic Harm
The precise nature of the stigmatic harm with which the Court is
concerned is somewhat elusive. The Court's rhetoric about "segregation"
and "apartheid," 9' taken literally, would suggest that it is the same sort of
stigmatic harm that was involved in Brown and the other segregation cases:
a feeling of inferiority generated by the state's broadcasting of the message
that "you are a pariah, not fit to mix with the rest of society." 9' But this
cannot be what the Court means. As Shaw's critics have often pointed out,
it is impossible to say with a straight face that the plaintiffs in Shaw and its
progeny-all of whom resided in districts that were quite racially
integrated-were being stigmatized in that particular way.93
88. See Shaw l, 509 U.S. 630, 649-50 (1993).
89. See id. (asserting that race-conscious districting "threatens special harms that are not
present in our vote-dilution cases"); see also United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744-45 (1995)
(discussing the special harms caused by racial voting classifications).
90. See Hays, 515 U.S. at 744-45.
91. See, e.g., Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 642 (characterizing the plaintiffs' claim as an allegation that
the state had "segregate[d] the races for purposes of voting"); id. at 647 (asserting that the race-
conscious districting plan under review "bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political
apartheid").
92. Cf Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY
257 (1996) (arguing that the principle that the government may not designate any group as social
"pariahs" is a fundamental, though often incompletely articulated, aspect of the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence).
93. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1055 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); Shaw II, 517
U.S. 899, 928 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 931 (1995)
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Nor can the stigmatic harm here be an insult to individual dignity
flowing from the state's use of race to predict political identity, as the
Court's references to "racial stereotyping" 9 might lead the casual reader to
think. If it were, the Court would have no principled reason to limit the
class of persons who have standing to assert the claim to those who reside
within a district, the design of which reflects the subordination of its
traditional districting principles to race,95 for whenever a state draws a
district like that, it necessarily is assigning voters on both sides of the
district's lines-both those it includes in the district and those it excludes
from it-by race.96
Properly understood, the stigmatic harm with which the Court is
concerned is, I believe, the insult that may be suffered when one is placed
in a district that everyone knows has been created for the special benefit of
one racial group. The precise nature of the potential insult varies, depending
on the race of the individual. For members of the race for whose special
benefit the district is being created, it is the implication that they need
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Shaw 1. 509 U.S. at 671 n.7 (White. J., dissenting); id. at 686 n.9 (Souter.
J., dissenting). This is not to say that an electoral districting plan that assigned all members of a
given racial minority to a single district consisting entirely of members of that minority could not
subject that minority to the very kind of stigmatic harm with which the Brown Court was
concerned. But none of the districts the Court struck down under Shaw cane close to doing that;
to the contrary, they were all quite racially mixed. See T. Alexander Alcinikoff & Samuel
Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno. 92 MICH.
L. REv. 588, 611-12 (1993) (observing that the districts challenged in Shaw I were " remarkably
integrated by usual American standards"); Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as
an American Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83. 94 & nn.52-53 (noting that the
districts challenged in Shaw I were "among the most integrated districts in the country");
Saunders, supra note 31, at 319 n.327 (noting that the districts challenged in Shaw I were each
approximately 53% black and 45% white). For further criticism of the Court's use of the terms
"segregation" and "apartheid" in this context, see Vera, 517 U.S. at 1055 (Souter, J., dissenting),
in which Justice Souter points out that "[w]hatever [the district challenged in Shaw l] may have
symbolized, it was not 'apartheid"'; and Shaw 1. 509 U.S. at 671 n.7 (White. J.. dissenting), in
which Justice White observes that the term "'segregat[ionl" is not "a particularly accurate
description of what has occurred" here.
94. See, e.g., Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 647 (describing the assumption that - members of the same
racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they
live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls" as an "impermissible racial stereotype[ I"); id. at 650 (criticizing racial gerrymandering for
reinforcing racial stereotypes).
95. See Hays, 515 U.S. at 744-45 (explaining the Court's standing doctrine as limited to those
who live in a gerrymandered district).
96. See Issacharoff & Goldstein, supra note 13. at 64 (explaining that "in districting, a
decision to include one kind of person is fundamentally also a decision to exclude other kinds of
people"); Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 34, at 2286-87 (arguing that both the minority citizens
who were included in the district and the white citizens who were excluded from it were "victims
of the same offensive, demeaning, or reductionist assumptions" about their political identity
(emphasis omitted)). Of course, it is possible that the Hays standing rule has no principled basis,
but is simply a crude way of limiting the number of Shaw claims that can be brought. If so, it is a
rather ineffective means of accomplishing that purpose. See Issacharoff, supra note 52, at 62
(noting that plaintiffs who satisfy the Hays standing rule will always be "readily available and
readily recruitable" in these cases); Issacharoff & Goldstein. supra note 13. at 62 (same).
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special help to win elections.' For everyone else in the district-the "filler
people" of other races, added to bring the district into compliance with the
mandate of one person, one vote9 -it is the implication that those
responsible for drawing districts do not care about their political interests,
whatever they are.99
Like all stigmatic harms, these are "expressive harms," for they
"result[] from the ideas or attitudes expressed through a governmental
action, rather than from the more tangible or material consequences the
action brings about."' 0 But they are not harms that all persons who live in a
state that has used race in districting can legitimately claim to have
suffered, as Shaw's critics have suggested. l ' Instead, they are suffered, if at
all, by only a small subset of the state's population: those who reside in
districts that everyone knows have been created for the special benefit of a
single racial group." 2
97. The notion that racial preferences may inflict this sort of stigmatic harm upon their
intended beneficiaries is a familiar one. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200,
241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (asserting that racial
preferences "stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority" and reinforce the belief that "because
of chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with [the majority]
without [its] patronizing indulgence"); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 516-
17 (1989) (plurality opinion) (stating that racial preferences stigmatize their intended
beneficiaries); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(explaining that racial preferences are "perceived by many as resting on an assumption that those
who are granted this special preference are less qualified in some respect that is identified purely
by their race"); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173-74 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part) (asserting that racial preferences "may act to stigmatize [the] recipient
groups," by "imply[ing] to some the recipients' inferiority and especial need for protection"). But
see Vera, 517 U.S. at 1055 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that the state's decision to draw a
district in which a given racial minority has a majority "implies nothing about the capacity.., of
the minority to which it gives the chance of electoral success").
98. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 93, at 630-33 (coining the term "filler people").
99. Cf. id. at 633 ("Whenever districts are drawn to create a designated group beneficiary, the
nonpreferred group is essentialized or, worse, denied their dignitary right[s] ... by having their
welfare discounted."). But see Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 931 n.l (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that white voters are not stigmatized by their assignment to majority-
minority districts).
100. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts, " and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv.
483, 506-07 (1993) (coining the term "expressive harm"); see also Vera, 517 U.S. at 984
(plurality opinion) (referring to "the expressive harms with which we are dealing"); id. at 1053
(Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that the harm involved here is "probably best understood as an
'expressive harm' (quoting Pildes & Niemi, supra, at 506-07)).
101. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 1053 (Souter, J., dissenting) (commenting that the "expressive
harms" the Court is describing "would seem to play no favorites, but to fall on every citizen...
alike"); Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899, 923-24 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]he
supposedly insidious messages that Shaw I contends will follow from extremely irregular race-
based districting will presumably be received in equal measure by all state residents"); id. at 928
(same); Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 34, at 2286 (asserting that the expressive harms the
Court is describing are suffered by "all voters" in the state); Pildes, supra note 18, at 2539 n.122
(same); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 100, at 514 (observing that any voter in the state can
"legitimately claim" to have suffered the "expressive harms" the Court is describing).
102. Of course, if all the electoral districts in a state fit this bill, then any resident of that state
might legitimately claim to have suffered such stigmatic harm. The Court ignores this difficulty.
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2. Representational Harm
The precise nature of the representational harm with which the Court
seems to be concerned is even more elusive. Again, the Court's rhetoric is
somewhat misleading. Taken literally, it suggests harm to the quality of
representation caused by the fact of representation by someone of a
different race.103 But surely this is not what the Court means, for such a
notion of representational harm would depend on the very stereotypical
assumptions that it finds so offensive: that members of different races
necessarily have different political interests, and that it is impossible for an
elected official of one race to provide citizens of another with effective
representation."0
Properly understood, the representational harm that the Court is
invoking has nothing to do with the race of the plaintiff or his
representative. 5 Rather, it has to do with the fact that his district's
population has been chosen on the basis of race. This gives rise to two
closely related risks. The first is that the district's representatives, whatever
their own race, will "believe that their primary obligation is to represent
only the members of [the racial] group [that has a majority in the district],
rather than their constituency as a whole." " If so, then residents of the
district who are not members of that racial group--the "filler people" -
may receive representation of a lesser quality than that received by its other
residents."l
The second risk is that the district will be an irrational district-so
irrational that no one can possibly represent it effectively. If we assume, as
apparently because it assumes that such a situation never will arise. Cf. Miller, 515 U.S. at 928-29
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that the Shaw doctrine "does not throw into [constitutional]
doubt the vast majority of the Nation's 435 congressional districts.... even though race may well
have been considered" in their design).
103. See Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993) ("When a district obviously is created solely to
effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to
believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than
their constituency as a whole."). For an example of someone who has been misled by this
rhetoric, see John Hart Ely, Standing To Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, Ill HARV. L
REv. 576, 587 (1997), in which Professor Ely characterizes the individualized harm with which
the Court is concerned as the inability to elect someone of one's own race.
104. Shaw's critics have delighted in pointing out this problem. See, e.g., Shaw 11, 517 U.S. at
927-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Miller, 515 U.S. at 930 (Stevens. J.. dissenting); Issacharoff &
Goldstein, supra note 13, at 55 & nn.36-38; Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 34. at 2278-79,
2287, 2290-91; Karlan, supra note 11, at 293-96.
105. See Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 638 (noting that the plaintiffs' complaint did not identify their
race).
106. Id at 648.
107. Perhaps this is what Professor Ely really means when he says that "a filler person ends
up to some degree worse off than someone who is a member of the racial majority of the district
in which he lives." Ely, supra note 103, at 590.
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the Court does, that race is not an accurate predictor of political interest, "
then a district constructed on the basis of race, whatever its precise racial
makeup, is functionally equivalent to a district constructed by drawing
names at random from a hat. There is a substantial risk that its residents will
have next to nothing in common with one another politically. If that is so,
then all of them-black, white, purple, and green-may end up receiving
representation of a lesser quality than that received by persons who live in
districts that have been designed on more rational grounds."°9
Unlike the stigmatic harms that are said to accompany them, these
representational harms are not "expressive" harms. But neither are they
harms that anyone who lives in a state that has used race in districting can
legitimately claim to have suffered. Instead, they are suffered, if at all, only
by those who reside in districts whose representatives believe that their
primary obligation is to represent only the members of a given racial group
and whose residents have little in common with one another politically."'
This is, then, the nature of the constitutional violation with which the
Court seems to be concerned in Shaw: the singling out of certain individuals
for special stigmatic and representational harms, without adequate
justification. The Court does not deny that race-conscious districting can
also give rise to a different kind of violation of equal protection rights: the
unjustified dilution of the strength of certain persons' voting strength.' But
it regards that risk as adequately constrained by pre-Shaw doctrine.
B. The Precautionary Measure: Compliance with Traditional Districting
Principles
To understand the prophylactic justification for Shaw, we must also
understand the Court's second premise: that race-conscious districting is
less likely to violate individual equal protection rights when the districts it
108. See Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 647 (criticizing the assumption "that members of the same
racial group---regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they
live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls"). Of course, as Shaw's critics have pointed out, the existing empirical evidence tends to
suggest that there may in fact be a substantial correlation between an individual's race and his or
her political interests and preferences, at least for the moment. For extensive documentation of
this correlation, see DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL
POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS (1996); and LUBLIN, supra note 12. But that is irrelevant to
my project here, which is to explain why the Court seems to think that drawing districts on the
basis of race may cause some or all of the residents of those districts to suffer some sort of
"representational harm."
109. See Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 863 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (per curiam) ("To
be an effective representative, a legislator must represent a district that has a reasonable
homogeneity of needs and interests; otherwise, the policies he supports will not represent the
preferences of most of his constituents." ).
110. Again, the Court ignores the possibility that all of the electoral districts in the state
might fit this bill.
I 1l. See Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 640.
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produces comply with certain traditional districting principles such as
compactness, contiguity, and respect for the integrity of political
subdivisions. Why? Once again, the Court has told us the answer in very
general terms: because it is less likely to subject anyone to special stigmatic
and representational harms."' But the Court again has failed to provide us
with a critical detail: an explanation of why this might be so. The Court's
failure to provide this detail has, I believe, tended to obscure further the
Miranda-like reasoning that lies behind the Shaw doctrine. As before,
however, it is possible to craft a plausible explanation for why race-
conscious districting is less likely to inflict the special stigmatic and
representational harms with which the Court is concerned when the districts
it produces comply with traditional districting principles.
First of all, each district will be less likely to be perceived as having
been created for the special benefit of one racial group. No matter what its
racial makeup relative to the state's population as a whole, it will be fairly
regular-looking, and the average person, who has no idea what information
the state actually took into account in designing it, will be less likely to
assume that it was created for the special benefit of a particular racial
group. Its residents therefore will be less likely to feel stigmatized by their
assignment to it,"' its representatives less likely to assume that their
primary obligation is to represent only the members of a particular racial
group,14 and its " filler people" less likely to suffer the special
representational harm that flows from being represented by someone who
feels no obligation to consider their interests." 
5
In addition, each district will be less likely to be made up of persons
who have no common political interests. No matter what its precise racial
makeup, it will consist of individuals who live relatively close to one
another and are likely, by virtue of their geographic proximity, to have
some common political interests." 6 Its residents therefore will be less likely
to suffer the special representational harm that can flow from being placed
in a district whose design is so irrational that no one can possibly represent
its residents effectively."
7
This is, I suggest, the explanation for the Court's assumption that race-
conscious districting is less likely to violate individual equal protection
rights when it produces districts that comply with the traditional districting
112. See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744-45 (1995).
113. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
114. Cf. Shaw l, 509 U.S. at 648.
115. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
116. Geographic proximity is thought to correlate with shared political interest. See, e.g.,
Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 863 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (per curiam) (stating that
"[t]here is some although of course not a complete correlation between geographical propinquity
and community of interests").
117. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
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principles that the Court has identified. If the Court's assumption is correct,
then those who engage in race-conscious districting can reduce significantly
the constitutional risks associated with their behavior by taking a simple
precautionary measure: making sure that the districts they produce comply
with those traditional districting principles.
C. The Per Se Rule and Its Justification
To understand the prophylactic justification for Shaw, we must, finally,
understand why it might make sense to substitute a per se rule on
discriminatory effect for case-by-case assessment of that issue in this
context. For it is a per se rule that the Court is adopting here: The Court is
not saying that race-conscious districting that fails to comply with its
traditional districting principles can, in some circumstances, have the effect
of singling out certain individuals for special stigmatic and representational
harms, but rather that it will be conclusively presumed to have such an
effect in all cases. The rule is somewhat overbroad, for there will be cases
in which some or all of the residents of a district the boundaries of which
have been drawn predominantly on the basis of race, in substantial
disregard of traditional districting principles, will not suffer any of the
special stigmatic and representational harms to which the Court refers." 8 As
I explain below, however, there may be good reason to prefer this slightly
overbroad per se rule to a case-by-case assessment of discriminatory effect
in this context.
In constitutional law, as elsewhere, the use of an overbroad per se rule
is generally justified on the basis that a more traditional case-by-case
approach would not produce an optimal level of enforcement.' Typically,
the Court will reason that the individual right at stake is an important one,'20
that violations of it are likely to occur with considerable frequency in this
particular setting,' that it is difficult for courts to identify those violations
118. For example, it is entirely possible that some or all of the district's residents will not feel
stigmatized by their assignment to it, that its representative will not believe that his or her primary
obligation is to represent only the members of one racial group, and that its residents will in fact
have some common political interests. If so, then the special stigmatic and representational harms
that the Court describes will not be inflicted upon all of its residents.
119. See Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 450-51; Strauss, supra note 20, at 192-93.
120. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 (1966) (emphasizing the importance
of the Fifth Amendment right at issue).
121. See id. at 445-58, 467 (explaining why police officers engaged in custodial interrogation
are likely to violate this right on a regular basis). In the context of custodial interrogation, the high
frequency of violations is a function not only of the fuzziness of the relevant constitutional
standard, but also of the pressures that the relevant state actors face. Police officers engaged in
custodial interrogation face considerable pressure from the public and their superiors to solve
crimes. As a result, they constantly are tempted to cross the constitutional line in extracting
confessions from suspects.
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on a case-by-case basis,"2 and that adhering to the traditional case-by-case
approach therefore will mean that many violations of the right will go
unremedied. The Court will acknowledge that replacing case-by-case
inquiry with an overbroad per se rule will produce some error in the other
direction, which will have some social cost.' But it will reason that some
degree of error is unavoidable in any enforcement scheme, and that it is
better, given the importance of the right, to err on the side of
overenforcement than of underenforcement.'" In addition, it may note that
the adoption of an overbroad per se rule will have some added benefits,
such as producing a substantial savings in litigation costs," leading to more
predictable results, 6 and giving the relevant state actors an incentive to
modify their behavior in ways that will reduce the number of violations
they commit in the first place.27
The overbroad per se rule embedded in the Shaiv doctrine can be
justified on these familiar grounds. The individual right at stake here-the
right not to be singled out for special disadvantage because of one's race in
the absence of a truly compelling justification-is one that virtually
everyone regards as very important. State actors engaged in race-conscious
districting are likely to violate that right with considerable frequency.s
122. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 & n.20 (1984) (explaining that
Miranda was in part a reaction to the difficulty courts had experienced with case-by-case
assessment of compulsion in the context of custodial interrogation).
123. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 703 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting that Miranda's per se rule imposes significant costs upon
society because it requires the suppression of some confessions that are not the product of
unconstitutional coercion, which impairs the administration of justice by concealing highly
probative and reliable evidence from the trier of fact).
124. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649. 656-57 (1984) (describing the Miranda
majority as engaging in this sort of reasoning). In addition to increasing the number of violations
that are remedied ex post, an overbroad per se rule will tend to reduce the number of violations
that occur ex ante, by changing the cost-benefit calculus that state actors will employ in deciding
how to act.
125. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 209 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that the overbreadth of the Miranda rule can be defended on the ground that it facilitates
"efficient judicial administration of the Fifth Amendment guarantee"); Berkemer 468 U.S. at 433
(asserting that one objective of Miranda's per se rule is "to free courts from the task of
scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions
were voluntary").
126. See, e.g., Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 430 (stating that one of the chief virtues of Miranda's
per se rule is its clarity, which makes it easy for both police officers and reviewing courts to
apply).
127. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 467, 476. 478-79 (1966); see also
Withrow, 507 U.S. at 702-03 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that Miranda's overbreadth can be defended on the basis that it "provides a strong incentive for
the police to adopt 'procedural safeguards' against the exaction of compelled or involuntary
statements" (citation omitted)); Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656 (observing that " [tihe Miranda decision
was based in large part on this Court's view that the warnings which it required police to give to
suspects in custody would reduce the likelihood that the suspects would fall victim to
constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation").
128. As in the Miranda context, the high probability of violations is a function not only of the
fuzziness of the relevant constitutional standard, but also of the pressures that the relevant state
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Identifying those violations on a case-by-case basis is difficult for courts
because of the subtle and abstract nature of the special harms involved. 29
Given the frequency with which these violations are likely to occur and the
difficulty of detecting them, a case-by-case approach is likely to mean that
many violations will go unremedied. While replacing the traditional case-
by-case approach with an overbroad per se rule will result in some error in
the other direction, this is a cost worth bearing given the importance of the
right. Substituting an overbroad per se rule for case-by-case inquiry into
discriminatory effect will produce other benefits as well: It will reduce
litigation costs, produce more predictable results, and encourage the
relevant state actors to modify their behavior in a way that may reduce the
number of violations they commit in the first place (complying with its
traditional districting principles).13 ° In addition, it will have the virtue of
preventing the courts from being used as a forum for the expression and
validation of racial prejudices. Absent the per se rule, equal protection
challenges to race-conscious districting plans would involve white plaintiffs
testifying that they feel stigmatized by being placed in districts that are
majority black, or that they believe that their representative does not
adequately consider their interests because he or she is too busy trying to
further the interests of their black neighbors. To a Court concerned about
fanning the flames of racial prejudice and racial division, as this one clearly
is, that surely is an unattractive prospect.
D. Oddities Explained
If, as I have suggested, we view the limitations that Shaw imposes on
race-conscious districting as a prophylaxis of sorts, then many of the
otherwise puzzling positions that the Court has taken in these cases make a
good deal more sense. We can understand, for example, why the Court,
speaking through Justice O'Connor, has insisted that the cause of action
recognized in Shaw is designed to redress individualized harm to some
subset of the state's residents, 3 ' even though it does not require proof that
the plaintiff is in fact being subjected to any such harm. The Court is not
actors face. State legislatures engaged in race-conscious districting face considerable pressure
from the U.S. Department of Justice, powerful racial minorities within the legislature, and
amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to draw plans that will ensure some degree of
minority electoral success. For this reason, they constantly are tempted to cross the constitutional
line in designing districts.
129. Cf. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744 (1995) (noting that "[dlemonstrating...
individualized harm... may not be easy" in this context).
130. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 985 (1996) (plurality opinion) (noting that Shaw has
had the salutary effect of encouraging legislators nationwide to modify their practices to
"reembrace[ ] the traditional districting practices that were almost universally followed before the
1990 census").
131. See Hays, 515 U.S. at 744; Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630, 649-50 (1993).
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requiring proof of that harm, because it is presuming its existence from
other facts that it is requiring the plaintiff to prove: specifically, that he
resides in a district that was constructed predominantly on the basis of race,
in substantial disregard of certain traditional districting principles.
So too can we understand why the Court, through Justice O'Connor,
has insisted that compliance with its traditional districting principles is not
constitutionally required, 32 even as it has cited a state's failure to do so as
grounds for invalidating its districting plan on constitutional grounds. If
Shaw is like Miranda, then failure to comply with those districting
principles in designing a particular district is not a violation of the
Constitution, in and of itself;133 it is simply a fact that, when combined with
evidence that race was intentionally taken into account in the districting
process, gives rise to a conclusive presumption that the district's residents
are being subjected to special stigmatic and representational harms.
Compliance with Shaw's traditional districting principles therefore is not
constitutionally required as such, just as the administration of Miranda
warnings is not.' 34 It is merely a precautionary measure that the Court is
urging state actors to take in order to reduce the number of constitutional
violations that race-conscious districting will produce. 3 s
Finally, and most significantly, we can understand why the Court has
held that the strict scrutiny of Shaw does not apply whenever the state
intentionally takes race into account in districting, but only when it makes
race the "predominant factor" in the districting process, "subordinat[ing]
traditional... districting principles ... to racial considerations." " Justices
132. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 962 (plurality opinion) (asserting that " [tlhe Constitution does not
mandate regularity of district shape"); Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 647 (stating that compliance with
traditional districting criteria like "compactness, contiguity, and respect for political
subdivisions" is "not... constitutionally required").
133. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 310 (1985) ("The failure of police to administer
Miranda warnings does not mean that the statements received have actually been coerced."); New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984) (" mhe failure to provide Miranda warnings in
and of itself does not render a confession involuntary.").
134. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433. 444 (1974); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). Of course, there are those who maintain that the
Constitution does in fact require the administration of Miranda warnings. See. e.g.. Elstad, 470
U.S. at 318-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 367-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Tucker, 417 U.S. at
462-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting). But the members of the Shaw majority never have been among
them. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680. 702 (1993) (O'Connor. J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (asserting that "Miranda's warnings requirement is not a dictate of the
Fifth Amendment itself"); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146. 160 (1990) (Scalia, .,
dissenting); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 209 (1989) (O'Connor, .. joined by Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("The Miranda rule is not, nor did it ever claim to be, a dictate of the Fifth
Amendment"); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444.
135. Cf. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656 ("The Miranda decision was based in large part on this
Court's view that the warnings which it required ... would reduce the likelihood that the suspects
would fall victim to constitutionally impermissible practices .... ).
136. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995); see also Vera, 517 U.S. at 958-59, 962-63
(plurality opinion); id. at 993 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Miller, 515 U.S. at 928 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, who seem to have accepted this limitation on
the scope of Shaw only grudgingly, 37 have characterized it as nothing but
an effort to implement the discriminatory-purpose requirement of
Washington v. Davis. 38 So understood, the limitation is indeed difficult to
defend. For years, the Court has insisted that Davis does not require proof
that race was the "predominant" reason for the challenged decision, just
proof that race was "a motivating factor" behind it. 39 As the Court has
explained, it can "[r]arely... be said that a legislature ... operating under
a broad mandate made a decision motivated solely by a single concern, or
even that a particular purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one," '40 and
"[t]he search for legislative purpose is... elusive enough, without a
requirement that primacy be ascertained." 4' If the Court intended Miller to
carve out a special exception to the usual race-a-motivating-factor test for
Shaw claims, it offered no justification for doing so. And, as others have
explained, a "predominant purpose" test is particularly unworkable in the
redistricting context."'
If, on the other hand, we understand the "predominant factor"
limitation as an attempt to confine the scope of a conclusive presumption or
per se rule on discriminatory effect,'43 then it makes a good deal more
137. Indeed, the questions that these Justices asked in oral argument in Hunt v. Cromartie,
526 U.S. 541 (1999), suggested that they were prepared to abandon this limitation. See Official
Transcript of Oral Argument Before the United States Supreme Court at 15-19, 43-45, Cromartie
(No. 98-85), available in 1999 WL 31144.
138. 426 U.S. 229, 239-48 (1976) (holding that a racially discriminatory purpose or intent is a
necessary element of an equal protection violation). For examples of these Justices describing the
"predominant factor" limitation as nothing but an effort to implement the Washington v. Davis
purpose requirement, see Justice Thomas's opinion for the Court in Cromartie, 119 S. Ct. at 1549
(Thomas, J., for the Court); his concurring opinion in Vera, 517 U.S. at 999-1003, which Justice
Scalia joined; and Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Miller, 515 U.S. at 912-13, 915-16.
For academic commentary to the same effect, see, for example, Briffault, supra note 54. at 50-57:
and Pildes, supra note 18, at 2506-07. Pildes describes Miller's "predominant factor" test as a
"motive-based" approach and an "intent standard" that "import[s] Washington v. Davis ... into
redistricting." Pildes, supra note 18, at 2506-07.
139. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66
(1977). Precisely for this reason, the plaintiffs in North Carolina's most recent racial-
gerrymandering case asked the U.S. Supreme Court to replace the Miller race-the-predominant-
factor test with the more traditional Arlington Heights race-a-motivating-factor test. See
Appellee's Brief on the Merits at 19, Cromartie (No. 98-85), available in 1998 WL 865623.
140. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
141. Id. at 265 n.11 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (quoting McGinnis v.
Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973)).
142. For an explanation of why this is so, see, for example, Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,
1059-62 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting); Pildes, supra note 18, at 2545-47; and Pildes & Niemi,
supra note 100, at 585-86. For further criticism of Miller's "predominant factor" test, see
Briffault, supra note 54, at 50-51, 56-57; Issacharoff, supra note 52, at 55-60; and Karlan, supra
note 11, at 300-06.
143. Justice O'Connor's opinions in this area strongly suggest that she sees the "predominant
factor" limitation as performing some function other than simply implementing the Davis purpose
requirement. In her brief concurrence in Miller, which was devoted entirely to this limitation, she
never used the terms "motive," "intent," or "purpose." See Miller, 515 U.S. at 928-29
(O'Connor, J., concurring). In her plurality opinion in Vera, she firmly rejected the argument that
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sense. As explained above, the special stigmatic and representational harms
that the Court has said race-conscious districting can inflict upon
individuals are likely to be suffered only by residents of districts that have
been constructed predominantly on the basis of race, in substantial
disregard of certain traditional districting principles."' By requiring a
plaintiff to make this showing in order to trigger the strict scrutiny of Shaw,
then, the Court is simply restricting its conclusive presumption of
discriminatory effect to situations in which there is a reasonable likelihood
that the plaintiff has in fact suffered the special harms it is presuming."
This is not to suggest, as some have,"'r that a state can completely
immunize a race-conscious districting plan from strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause by making sure that its lines comply with the
traditional districting principles that the Court has identified. Indeed, the
Miranda analogy suggests precisely the opposite. If compliance with those
traditional districting principles is just a means of reducing the risk that
race-conscious districting will result in violations of individual equal
protection rights, then it should not completely insulate a plan from strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, any more than administration of
Miranda warnings completely insulates a statement from Fifth Amendment
the state's neglect of traditional districting principles was relevant only as circumstantial evidence
of its racial motivation, insisting that it was also, and more fundamentally, "part of the
constitutional problem." Vera, 517 U.S. at 981 (plurality opinion). She insisted that proof that the
state had intentionally designed the challenged district to have a certain racial makeup was not
sufficient to satisfy the "predominant factor" requirement, see id at 958-59, 962 (plurality
opinion); id. at 993 (0' Connor, J., concurring), even though, as Justice Thomas pointed out it
would have been sufficient to characterize the state's action as racial gerrymandering. See id. at
1001 (Thomas, J., dissenting). All of this suggests that she may understand the "predominant
factor" limitation as performing some function other than simply implementing the Davis purpose
requirement. Cf. Issacharoff & Goldstein, supra note 13, at 66 (remarking that "the legislature's
mindset" does not appear to be "the focus" of Justice O'Connor's analysis).
144. See supra notes 97-102, 106-110 and accompanying text.
145. See Shaw I, 517 U.S. 899, 931 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("'This higher threshold
for triggering strict scrutiny comports with the fact that the shared representational and stigmatic
harms that Shaw purports to guard against are likely to occur only when the State subordinates
race-neutral districting principles to a racial goal." (citing Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630. 646-49 (1993))).
On this view, the degree to which race has infected the districting process is important not for
what it says about the possibility that the law has an improper purpose, but for what it says about
the law's likely effect. I do not mean to suggest that Shaw claims are exempt from the Davis
purpose requirement. They plainly are not. Indeed, the bulk of the Court's opinion in Shaw I was
devoted to explaining that the requirement can be satisfied by circumstantial evidence like the
shape and racial demographics of the challenged district. My point is simply that the
"predominant factor" limitation the Court added to the Shaw doctrine in Miller may go primarily
to the question of discriminatory effect, rather than discriminatory purpose. Cf. Pildes, supra note
18, at 2507 (noting that the Court has begun to decide Shaw cases "in ways that cannot be
reconciled with a primary emphasis on ferreting out legislative intent"); id. at 2547, 2549 (citing
the Court's approval of a deliberately drawn majority-minority district in DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F.
Supp. 1409 (E.D. Cal. 1994), aft'd, 515 U.S. 1170 (1995)).
146. See Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 932 (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Miller
"demonstrates that ... States may avoid strict scrutiny by complying with traditional districting
principles"); cf Pildes, supra note 18, at 2541 (suggesting that the Court should impose strict
scrutiny only when a state has departed "unreasonably" from traditional districting principles).
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challenge.'47 It should deprive a plaintiff of the ability to use Shaw's per se
rule to establish the discriminatory effect required to trigger strict scrutiny,
just as the administration of Miranda warnings deprives a criminal
defendant of the ability to use Miranda's per se rule to establish coercion."8
But the plaintiff should remain free to establish that element of his equal
protection claim, and to trigger strict scrutiny, by more conventional means:




If Shaw and its progeny establish a per se rule that overprotects
individual constitutional rights in some cases in order to ensure adequate
enforcement of those rights across a range of cases, then there is one
striking difference between that per se rule and the one that the Court
crafted in Miranda. The Miranda rule is quite specific, while the Shaw rule
is not. When the Court promulgated a per se rule in Miranda, it defined the
contours of that rule with considerable precision. In addition to stating that
it would apply the rule to any statement made during a custodial
interrogation that had been conducted without the prior administration of
certain warnings, it described those warnings in such detail' that it was
criticized for legislating from the bench.'' In retrospect, however,
Miranda's specificity has emerged as one of its chief virtues. 5 Because the
147. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984) (noting that compliance with
the Miranda warnings requirement will not "conclusively establish[ I the voluntariness of a
subsequent confession").
148. See id.
149. Cf. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984) (noting that a defendant who is
not entitled to Miranda's presumption of coercion can still have his confession excluded on Fifth
Amendment grounds if he provides actual evidence of coercion). On this view, the Court's much-
maligned insistence that its decision in Shaw is not inconsistent with its earlier decision in United
Jewish Organizations v. Carey (UJO), 430 U.S. 144 (1977), see Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 651-52,
seems a good deal more plausible. As Justice O'Connor explained in Shaw I, the districts
challenged in UJO, though deliberately drawn to give a certain racial group a majority, complied
with the traditional districting principles that the Court identified in Shaw. See id. at 651. As a
result, the plaintiffs in UJO were not entitled to Shaw's conclusive presumption of special
disadvantage, and could trigger strict scrutiny only by producing actual evidence that the
challenged lines actually subjected them to some special disadvantage. Because they failed to do
so, the Court properly rejected their equal protection challenge.
150. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-73 (1966) (holding that the suspect must be
clearly informed "that he has the right to remain silent," "that anything [he says] can and will be
used against [him] in court," "that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer
with him during interrogation," and "that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent
him").
151. See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 278 (1967) (criticizing the Court for
"utilizing the Bill of Rights to prescribe a detailed code of criminal procedure").
152. The Court has recognized this on numerous occasions. For some prominent examples,
see Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680-82 (1988); Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 430; and Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979).
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Court has defined the contours of the per se rule so precisely, state actors
have little doubt about what they must do to avoid triggering it, and courts
reviewing their conduct after the fact have little doubt about when they
should apply it.153 The result has been a substantial degree of compliance
with the Fifth Amendment ex ante" and a substantial reduction in the
administrative costs incurred to enforce the Fifth Amendment ex post. 5 A
less specific rule would not have produced these benefits.
As currently formulated, the per se rule that the Court has crafted in
Shaw is much less precise. The Court has indicated that the rule applies
whenever the state has used race as the "predominant factor" in the design
of the challenged district, "subordinat[ing] traditional race-neutral
districting principles... to racial considerations." " But this formulation
contains all sorts of ambiguities and uncertainties. What are the traditional
districting principles to which the Court refers? How is compliance with
those districting principles to be measured? And how much compliance
with them is necessary to establish that they have not been "subordinated"
to race? Absent these specifics, the rule that the Court has promulgated is
much like one that says the police should give suspects warnings before
interrogating them, but fails to specify the precise content of those
warnings.
The Court's lack of precision prevents Shaw's per se rule from realizing
some of its most significant potential benefits: increasing compliance with
the Constitution ex ante and reducing the administrative costs of enforcing
the Constitution ex post. Because state actors cannot tell with any certainty
what the rule requires of them, the rule is unlikely to produce a substantial
increase in their compliance with the Constitution. And because courts
reviewing their conduct after the fact cannot tell with any certainty when to
apply the rule, the rule is unlikely to produce a substantial savings in
administrative costs.
153. See Fare, 442 U.S. at 718 (acknowledging that Miranda -has the virtue of informing
police and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial
interrogation, and of informing courts under what circumstances statements obtained during such
interrogation are not admissible," and that this "specificity ... benefits the accused and the State
alike").
154. Cf. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis. 42 DuKE L.J. 557
(1992) (explaining that when a legal command is expressed as a rule that individuals can apply
with little difficulty, individuals will be more likely to choose to conform their conduct to the law
than they will when it is expressed as a standard that will be given content only after they act).
155. Miranda's per se rule reduces the costs of enforcing the Fifth Amendment ex post in two
ways. First, it reduces the number of violations that occur by encouraging police officers to
modify their conduct in ways that will produce fewer violations. Second. it reduces the amount of
time and effort that courts and litigants must spend identifying and redressing those violations that
do occur.
156. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958-
65 (1996) (plurality opinion); id. at 993 (O'Connor, J.. concurring); Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899. 905-07
(1996); Miller, 515 U.S. at 928 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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To make Shaw's per se rule realize its true potential, the Court must
give it greater precision. In particular, the Court needs to explain exactly
what state actors must do in order to avoid triggering it. The best, and
perhaps only, way for the Court to do this is to replace Miller's vague
"predominant factor" test with a rigid rule that the strict scrutiny of Shaw
applies only to districts that not only are the product of a districting process
in which race was intentionally considered, but that also fail to comply with
certain clearly identified districting principles. 57
This would mean replacing the amorphous and potentially open-ended
term "traditional districting principles" with a finite list of districting
criteria that have specific and objective content. For example, the Court
might say that the districts must be contiguous and that they must have a
dispersion-compactness score of at least 0.245' and a perimeter-
compactness score of at least 0.12.' As others have noted,"6 such a step
would be analogous to what the Court did in Reynolds v. Sims 16' and its
157. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 1057, 1070-72, 1077 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that this is
the only way for the Court to make Shaw manageable, unless it is prepared to eliminate the
practice of geographic districting altogether or to require that districting be done on a completely
random basis); Pildes, supra note 18, at 2547-51 (urging the Court to do this); see also Aleinikoff
& Issacharoff, supra note 93, at 621 (calling this a "possible" solution to "the ambiguity of
Shaw").
158. The dispersion-compactness measure attempts to capture "how tightly packed or spread
out the geography of a district is." Richard G. Niemi et al., Measuring Compactness and the Role
of a Compactness Standard in a Test for Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering, 52 J. POL. 1155,
1160 (1990). A district's dispersion-compactness score is the ratio of the area of the district to the
area of the smallest circle that completely encloses the district. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note
100, at 554. A district that is a perfect circle has a dispersion-compactness score of 1.0. See id. at
555. Districts that are long and narrow, or have numerous appendages radiating from a central
core, will have lower dispersion-compactness scores than those with relatively square shapes. See
id. at 554. The two districts challenged in Shaw L Districts I and 12 in North Carolina's 1991
congressional redistricting plan, had dispersion-compactness scores of 0.25 and 0.05, respectively.
See id. at 562 tbl.2. For a look at some other congressional districts of the 1990s with dispersion-
compactness scores of less than 0.24, see id. at 547-48 figs.3(d)-(f).
159. The perimeter-compactness measure attempts to capture "the extent to which [al
district's borders wander in irregular ways." Pildes & Niemi, supra note 100, at 555. A district's
perimeter-compactness score is the ratio of the district's area to the area of a circle with the same
perimeter. See id. at 555; Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion:
Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y
REv. 301, 348-49 (1991) (referring to this as "the Schwartzberg measure"). A district that is a
perfect circle will have a perimeter-compactness score of 1.0. See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 100,
at 555 n.203. Districts with highly irregular borders will have lower perimeter-compactness scores
than those with more regular shapes. See id. at 556. Districts 1 and 12 in North Carolina's 1991
congressional redistricting plan had perimeter-compactness scores of 0.03 and 0.01, respectively.
See id. at 562 tbl.2. For a look at some other congressional districts of the 1990s with perimeter-
compactness scores of less than 0.12, see id. at 544-45 figs.2(e)-(g).
160. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 93, at 621-22; Pildes & Niemi, supra note 100.
at 586-87.
161. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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progeny, when it translated the vague mandate of Baker v. Carr'6 into the
crude but easily administered "one person, one vote" rule.
Why has the Court not done this already? There are at least two
possible reasons. First, the Court may be concerned that particularizing
Shaw in this way would be inconsistent with its longstanding position that
the Constitution does not require the states to comply with traditional
notions of compactness and contiguity. 63 Second, it may regard itself as
institutionally ill-suited to the task of formulating specific rules of district
shape, a task that seems quintessentially legislative in nature.
The first concern is easily answered. Under the view of Shaw that I
have suggested here, the Court would not be promulgating constitutional
rules on district shape with which every state in the country would be
required to comply. Instead, it would be developing subconstitutional
districting principles for states engaged in race-conscious districting to
follow-principles that, if followed, would enable those states to avoid
Shaw's per se rule.1" Compliance with those districting principles would
not be constitutionally required, just as the administration of Miranda
warnings is not. Rather, it would be a safe harbor of sorts for states engaged
in race-conscious districting-a way to deny those who would mount equal
protection challenges to their plans the ability to rely on Shaw's conclusive
presumption of discriminatory effect.
The second concern has more force. Indeed, at first glance, the concern
about institutional competence seems more compelling here than it was in
Miranda. Most judges are, by virtue of their own professional experience,
quite familiar with the dynamics of police work, at least as familiar as their
colleagues in the legislatures. When it comes to formulating code-like rules
to govern custodial interrogation, then, there is little reason to suspect that
legislatures will do a better job than courts. Redistricting, on the other hand,
is a matter with which legislatures have much more experience than courts,
and it seems logical to assume that they will be better than courts at
developing specific rules to govern it.
Upon closer examination, though, the institutional competence concern
is less compelling. While legislatures may have more experience with
redistricting than courts, their members are the very people who have the
greatest stake in the precise content of the legal rules that govern the
162. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that malapportionment of a state legislature can violate the
Equal Protection Clause, without explaining precisely when that might be so).
163. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 93, at 623 (calling this "[tlhe major problem"
with this solution to the vagaries of Shaw). The Miranda Court did not have to deal with this
difficulty. At the time Miranda was decided, there was no preexisting body of case law holding
that the specific precautionary measures that the Court was announcing were not constitutionally
required.
164. As Rick Pildes has pointed out, this is precisely what lower courts applying Shaw seem
to be doing in practice, whether they acknowledge it or not. See Pildes, supra note 18, at 2549-50.
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redistricting process. Precisely for this reason, they are less competent than
the courts-indeed, uniquely incompetent-to formulate code-like rules to
govern that process. Indeed, the courts would seem to be the only institution
of government that is sufficiently disinterested to be entrusted with the task.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Essay, I have argued that the restrictions that the Court has
imposed on race-conscious districting in Shaw and its progeny may be an
example of a phenomenon that is pervasive in our constitutional law: the
crafting of prophylactic rules that overprotect individual constitutional
rights in some cases in order to ensure adequate enforcement of those rights
across a range of cases. I do not contend that this is the only plausible
explanation for the Court's work here, just that it is one plausible
explanation, more plausible than any that has been offered to date. On this
view, Shaw and its progeny are nowhere near as radical as the Court's
critics on the left would have us believe. Nor is the doctrine that the Court
has constructed in Shaw as intellectually incoherent as its critics-both left
and right-have suggested.
What are the implications of this understanding of Shaw? In terms of
the future development of the Shaw doctrine, it means that there is a good
deal more room to maneuver here than most of us have assumed. If Shaw is
in fact just a prophylactic measure like Miranda, then litigants should feel
free to ask courts to devise additional prophylactic rules to supplement it
when doing so would help safeguard the underlying equal protection
rights.'65 By the same token, litigants should feel free to ask courts to carve
out exceptions to Shaw's per se rule in situations in which the rule's costs
outweigh its benefits. 66
On a broader jurisprudential level, this understanding of Shaw suggests
that the drive toward colorblindness that we have seen in the Court's equal
165. In the years since Miranda was decided, the Court has announced a number of other
prophylactic rules that provide additional layers of protection for the underlying constitutional
right. For a prominent example, see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), which adopted a
per se rule that once a suspect has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial
interrogation, further interrogation may not take place unless the suspect himself initiates it. The
Court has described the Edwards rule as a "prophylactic" measure that works together with the
Miranda rule to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by
discouraging the police from badgering suspects into waiving their right to remain silent. See
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983)
(plurality opinion).
166. Since Miranda was decided, the Court has employed this sort of cost-benefit analysis to
justify creating a number of exceptions to its per se rule. For a prominent example, see New York
v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), in which the Court relied on cost-benefit analysis to justify
recognizing a "public safety" exception to Miranda's warning requirement. See id. at 653-60.
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protection jurisprudence'67 may not represent a radical, ahistorical
reinterpretation of the core meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, as
many have assumed. Instead, it may represent judicial activism of a
different, and perhaps less pernicious, sort: the crafting of overbroad
prophylactic rules designed to implement that core understanding.' The
Rehnquist Court, it seems, is conducting its revolution in race with tools
borrowed from the Warren Court's revolution in constitutional criminal
procedure. If so, then the pending challenge to Miranda' 69 may have
ramifications far beyond the context of custodial interrogation.
167. The most obvious illustrations of this trend are the cases striking down race-based
affirmative action programs. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pcia. 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). But the phenomenon is not limited to that
context. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (invoking the Equal Protection Clause
to invalidate the prosecution's use of race-based peremptory challenges in criminal cases).
168. Cf. Levinson, supra note 20, at 903-04 n.191 (suggesting that the Court's prohibition on
race-based affirmative action can be seen as "a prospective, prophylactic remedy for an
antisubordination equal protection right," rather than a recognition " that colorblindness is itself
the goal of equal protection").
169. See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 578
(1999).
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